Recent attempts to clarify these ambiguities have led to the useful distinction between "generalized" and "complex" hunter-gatherers (Price and Brown 1985 ; see also Woodburn's immediateldelayed return distinction [1980] , and Testart 1988) . It is the first category-peoples who hunted and gathered and who were organized into egalitarian bands-that will be the main focus of this discussion, though both simple nonfbragers and complex fbragers will be referred to from time to time.
The fluctuating fortunes of hunter-gatherer studies are tied as well to ambiguities that lie at the root of the field of anthropology itselc not the least of which revolves around the much debated concept of the primitive. Many would argue along with Stanley Diamond (1974:118) that the "search for the primitive" is the heart of anthropology's unique role in the human sciences. And much of the historv of hunter-patherer studies is linked to our multifaceted understandings of the primitive, either in Diamond's sense, in the quest for origins and fundamentals, or in what Lkvi-Strauss terms anthropology's deeper purpose "to bear testimony to future generations ofthe ingeniousness, diversity, and imag.-ination of our species" (1 968:349).
But for other anthropologists the preoccupation with the primitive is an anachronism. For some the primitive is an illusion, an arbitrary construction of the disembodied "other" divorced from history and context (e.g., Clifford 1983; Sperber 1985; Wagner 1981) . The result of this ambiguity is that there is a body of opinion in anthropologynot unconnected to views in other disciplines about "the end ofhistory" and particularly among postmodernists-which would find anthropology's preoccupation with the primitive an acute embarrassment; as a consequence, the concept of hunter-gatherers becomes moot (Wilmsen 1989:xi-xviii, 1-6) .
1 1 second area of ambiguity is the nature o f t h e anthropological enterprise itself'. Anthropology has never declared itselfunequivocally on the matter of whether it is a particularizing, historical discipline interested in understanding unit cultures, or whcther it is a generalizing, nomothetic science searching for the broadest possible explanatory frameworks. Hunter-gatherer studies broadly defined has vigorous adherents of both these tendencies, going rlght back to Boas (1935 Boas ( , 1966 and Kroeber (1925) exemplifying the first tendency, and Steward (1936 Steward ( , 1938 and Radcliffe-Brown (1922 , 1931 the second.
The history ofhunter-gatherer studies, especially since the "Man the Hunter" conference in 1966 (Lee and DeVore 1968) , illustrates both anthropology's ambiguities and the problematic role of hunter-gatherer studies within it. Among the persistent issues of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s have been debates on the following.:
1 . Evolutionism. T h e use and misuse of hunter-eathcrer data to understand the fossil record andlor the evolution of human behavior has long been a contentious issue, as has been the concept of evolutionism itself. Hunter-gatherer studies have tended to en.joy respectability among some evolutionists (Isaac 1978; Lancaster 1978; Tanner and Zihlman 1976) and to be viewed with suspicion by others (Wobst 1978; Foley 1988). 2. Optimal Foraging Strategies. Modelers of the behavioral ccology of hunter-gatherers have continued to advocate a nomothetic research strategy and to refine quantitative methodologies at a time when much of the field was moving in the opposite direction. It has been the focus of notable research (Winterhalder and Smith 1981; Hawkes, Hill, and O'Connell 1982; Hill and Hawkes 1983) but also of some pointed critiques (Keene 1983; Martin 1983) .
3. Woman the Gatherer. Feminist aqendas and priorities have entered hunter-gatherer discourse initially through the ecological issue, raised in "Man the Hunter," of' whether women's work in gathering plant foods is not more important to subsistence than men's hunting. This has led to a number of books and articles on gender, women's work, and women's power in foraging society. A significant segment of feminist anthropology has drawn heavily on hunter-gatherer studies (Slocum 1975; Begler 1978; Dahlberg 1981; Hunn 1981; Leacock 1981; Sacks 1979: Tanner and Zihlman 1976) .
4. World View and Symbolic Analysis. Studies of the systems of meaning that give shapc and coherence to hunter-gatherer identity and cosmology have been increasingly in evidence as a countercurrent to and implicit critique of the predominant ecological orientation of much of hunter-gatherer studies (Myers 198613; Ridington 1990; Brody 1981; Endicott 1979). 5. Hunter-Gatherers in Prehistory. Archeologists have always had a strong interest in hunter-gatherer ethnography and its uses fbr interpreting the past (Binford 1978; Yellen 1977 ; Keene 1991) . Currently, archeological interest in fbragers exceeds by a wide margin interest by social and cultural anthropologists. Increasingly, archeologists are working directly with contemporary gatherer-hunters under the rubric ofethnoarcheology, and the questions archeologists ask are often quite different fiom the problematics within which social anthropologists work (Binford 1980; Paynter 1989; Yellen 1990; Wiessner 1982) .
6. Hunter-Gatherers in History. T h e links of foraging peoples with the wider world, both in the present and in the past, have been a growing focus stimulated in part by world-systems analysis and by the publication of Wolfs Europe and the Peoples wtthout Hzstory see also Schrire 1984; \Vilmsen 1988 \Vilmsen , 1989 Headland and Reid 1989) . One effect of this move toward historicizing has been to call into question the very idea of hunter-qatherers, and to argue seriously that they are a noncategory, a construction of the observers.
Two Cultures, or Three, or Four?
\Vhat analytical frameworks would be most useful and productive in sorting out the complex currents and countercurrents in the study of hunting and gathering peoples today? It might be hclpful to recall C. P. Snow's famous essay, "The Two C:ultures" ( 1959) , in which he explored the eternal conflict between two irreconcilable academic subcultures: the humanistic and the sczent$c.' In the first, scholarship was devoted to the study of meanings and interpretations in great works of art and literature. In the second, scholarship was dedicated to systematic and rigorous investigation of natural laws and general principles governing the natural and human world.
:\nthropology is an apt example of a discipline that finds itself straddling the boundaries ofC. P. Snow's two cultures. \Vithin the discipline today there is a powerful current movillg toward thc view of anthropology as essentially a humanistic, even literary discipline, where truth, apart from the poetic variety, is unattainable. An equally strong current moves in the opposite direction, embracing the promisc and moral authority of science and strenqthcning its commitment to improved techniques of data collection and measurement, coupled with more (not less) rigorous application of theory. T h e first sees itself as modclcd after literature and literarv criticism. the second draws its ins~iration from theoretical biology and evolutionary ecology as well as an updated and recharged structural-functionalism."
Within hunter-gatherer studies, the struggles and contradictions between the humanistic and scientific cultures are played out in a number of wavs. \Vhile the scientists are
gathering data for the construction ofmathematical models of forager predator-prey behavior, the humanists, working sometimes amon,q the same people, are collecting life histories of elders and recording and interpreting cosmologies Bnd religious beliefs:
But there is a third culture embedded in current anthropological practice. This school sees neither humanistic nor scientific discourses as adequate to account for the past, present, and future of anthropological subjects. Raising issues of' context and history, and placing foragers in regional systems, some scholars focus on the overriding issue of the relations offoragers with the world system. I will call this the "culture" ofpolitical economy.
The first anthropological perspective draws its inspiration from the interpretivist, structuralist, and hermeneutic traditions of Clifford Geertz (1973 ), Claude Ltvi-Strauss (1963 , Mary Douglas (1966 ), Victor Turner ( 1969 , and <James C l i f i r d Clifford and hfarcus 1986) ; the second from the positivist and adaptationist current of Julian Steward (1936 Steward ( , 1938 , Lew Binford (1978 , and others (e.g., Harris 1979) ; and the third from the critical Marxist tradition in which Eric Wolfand Sidney blintz are situated (Wolf 1982; Mintz 1985; Leacock 1981 ; see also Roseberry 1989, Patterson and Gailey 1987) . Each approach has a distinctive methodological stance and each has made important contributions to hunter-gatherer studies. In fact, however much one may profess allegiance to one or another of the three cultures, in practice elements of all three approaches are frequently employed in contemporary research projects (fbr a classic example of synthesis, see Sahlins 1968) .
My first intention in writing this paper was to give a critical appraisal of research contributions to hunter-gatherer studies from each o f t h e anthropological traditions. But a prior question must be addressed, an issue that poses a challenge to the entire collective enterprise so fundamental that to ignore it would be to fiddle while Rome burns.' Following the lead of Foucault, Derrida, and the French poststructuralists, several anthropologists have declared hunter-gatherers a noncategory, a construction of observers mired in one or another brand ofromantic idealism. T h e claims of this group are so farreaching and so ill-contained within the paradigm space of the three cultures that they could be said to constitute a fourth culture rendering irrelevant large parts of the other three.
Revisionism, as it has been called, combining .some elements of political economy with .some elements of poststructuralism, presents a fundamental challerlge to the way that anthropologists have looked at hunter-gatherers for the past 30 years. It posits that foragers are not what they appear to be; and it proposes a drastic rethinking of our subject. Schrire poses the revisionist challenge in these terms:
, -I here can he no doubt that, one way or another, all [ethnographies ofhunter-gatherers] descril~e socirties coping xvith the impact of incursions by foreign forces into their territories. . . . T h e big question that arises is, are the common features of hunter-ptherer groups, be they structural elements such as bilateral kinshir, svstems or behavioral ones such as the trndencv to share food.
.
a product ofintrraction \vith u s )Ire the features \ve single out and studv held in common, not so much because humanity shared the hunter-gatherer life-st\le for 9Y0/o ofits time on carth. but k~ecause the hunter-gatherers of today, in searching 1i)r the compromises that \vould allow them to go on doing mainly that. have reached some subliminal consensus in finding similar solutions to similar problems? [1984: 181 And Wilmsen, writing of the Kalahari San, puts it this way the current status of the San-speaking peoples on the rural fringe of :\frican economies can be accounted tbr only in terms of the social policies and economies of the colonial period and its aftermath. Their appearance as tbragers is a function of their relegation to an underclass in the p1a)ing out of historical processes that began before the current millennium and culminated in the rarly decades of this centur\. The ~toiatzon in zt,/rirh they are taid to bejiuntl i~ a creation oj"our ziezt' ofthem, not !/'their Iri~tory a~ ttz~~'iiz~et1 it. This is as true of their indigenous material s\stelns as it is oftheir incorporation in \cider spheres of political economy of southern 12frica. [ 1989::3, emphasis added] There are two components to the revisionist critique, and it is essential to recognize the distinction between them. First there is the argument from history (see, e.g., Myers 1988:262-264; Headland and Reid 1989) that accuses past ethnographers of misreading or ignoring history and political economy and hence of treating the society in question as more bounded, morc isolated, and morc pristine than it really is. Political-economic revisionism argues that foragers have been integrated into larger regional or even intcrnational structures of power and rxchangc for so long that they can rrvral nothing about the hunter-gatherer way of life. Evidence of tradc and political domination is cited in support of this thesis. Linked to this line of critique is the purported discovery in huntergatherers of relations of domination and wealth accumulation previously associated with class societies (Price and Brown 1985; Legros 1985) ."
These critiques raise important issues, yet in terms of method, the argument remains on familiar terrain: one examines the historical, archeological, or other data and tests the merits of competing hypotheses against these data. il'erc the hunter-gatherers in question isolated? LVhat does archeology reveal? What is the most parsimonious explanation for the observed facts? This is what Jacqueline Solway and I did in a recent Current Anlhropolocg article titled "Foragers, Genuine or Spurious7' (1990) , meeting the issues raised by revisionists with empirical data that refuted their position.
The poststructuralist criticism, by contrast, takes a much more radically skeptical line. This view, linked to some versions of postmodernism, to deconstruction, and to a variety of other current schools, argues that there is no truth, only regimes of truth and power, and that all anthropology is powerfully shaped by the cultural constructions o f t h e observer. Thus, ethnographic writing (about foragers or anybody else) has more in common with the historical novel and other works of fiction than it has with a scientific treatise. Therefore, the task of ethnography becomes immeasurably more problematic; truth is at best partial, flawed, obscured, and above all relative. ' This argument has radical implications for methodology. T h e production ofknowledge has left the realm of empirical investigation and analytical methods of the past can no lonser be relied upon. One can no longer utilize, for example, the eticlemic distinction because science after all is really only "Western emic" (Marcus and Fischer 1986:18& 181) . The use of Occam's Razor or the law of parsimony to choose between the merits of two competing explanations is no longer admissible because all are "true" at some level.
What impact does this have on the study of foragers? Political economists and poststructuralists have tended to make the same critique ofethnographic practice, but as we shall see, for rather different reasons. Both argue the extraordinary proposition that the natives are "Us," and both put into question the assumption that hunter-gatherers, whatever they may be, represent the "Other." T h e political economists argue that the natives are to all intents like Euro-Americans, because relations of domination and/or merchant capital reached the Arctic or the Ituri Forest or Sarawak long before ethnographers did and, therefore, tributary or mercantilist or capitalist relations of production have transformed foragers into people like ourselves, as parts of larger systems with hierarchies, commodities, exploitation, and other inequities and all their accompanying social consequences (Schrire 1984:18) . Poststructuralists take the view that because anthropologists (like everyone else) are prisoners of their own ideology, as a consequence they can see in the "other" only a flawed perception of themselves. Thus, in either scenario, the "other" is declared a noncategory.
Ifthe revisionist/poststructuralist position merits serious consideration-and the sheer volume of journal articles on these topics suggests that it does-then a major tenet of anthropology from Boas forward-that anthropology is the study of difference-becomes untenable. O r if "difference" is to be preserved as an anthropological problematic, then anthropology becomes the study of difference mutually constructed by powerful masters and powerless subalterns within a single world system.
In what follows I will explore the roots of the curious proposition that the natives are only different in surface features and that in truth they are "us." I see it as a peculiar expression of the intellectual culture of Late <:apitalism. Anthropolosical revisionism lies at the intersection of two major tenets ofcontemporary Western thought: Proposition 1-h70thing i~ real; and Proposition 2-The '$stern" is all-powerful.
Nothing Is Real
1Ye live i11 an era i11 which the line between real and nonreal has become dangerously blurred. What is real has become a scarce commodity and the pursuit of the "real" sometimes becomes a desperate search. Under capitalism, as Marshall Berman (quoting Marx) titles his book, "all that is solid melts into air" (1983) . \.Ye don't have to search far for evidence of this proposition. The Disney corporation produces and distributes in a single fiscal year, perhaps in a single week, more fantasy material to more people than entire archaic civilizations could produce in a century. Statcs of the Left, Right, and Center and their bureaucracies also produce prodigious volumes of fantasy, and through advertising and other media elites deploy enormous manipulative power (Ewen 1976) . A recent ad for cigarettes (typical of the thousands that bombard Euro-Americans daily) has a picture of a carefully posed professional model, turned out as a fashion photographer, pretending to photograph another professional model herself posing, surrounded by other posed models in postures of forced gaiety. The caption: "Real PeopleIReal Taste."
T o protect the psyche from this type of assault, consumers and citizens in the West (and East) can be forgiven for erecting a shell of cynicism as a survival strategy under conditions of extreme debasement of the currency of reality. In fact it is hard to imagine keeping your sanity by any other means. This position of cool detachment and ironic distanciation has been considered the hallmark of the "postmodern condition" (Lyotard 1984; Sloterdijk 1987; Jameson 1984) .
The world of scholarship has not escaped these massive social and psychological forces. In The Invention of Tradition (1983) Hobsbawm and Ranger and others show how allegedly hallowed customs handed down from the past are in fact the product of recrnt history. In his method of deconstruction, Derrida has argued that history is akin to a literary text and, like all texts, is ultimately unknowable (1976, 1978) . It seems a short strp to extending a critical and debunking discourse to all anthropological subjects.
But along the way there has been a slippage. The tools of deconstruction, developed to debunk and call into question the high and mighty, are now being applied to the powerless. Where the invention-of-tradition perspective was initially deployed to deconstruct the public rituals of the 19th-century British monarchy or pomp and circumstance in colonial India, it was now being generalized to question the claims to authenticity of small peoples. In his influential work, The Predzcament ofCulture, James Clifford shows how the Mashpee Indians construct their identity de novo in order to meet the rxigencies of a court case (Clifford 1988) . Similar arguments (but with less sympathy for thr subalterns) have been made for the Maori by Hanson (1989) and for the ancient Hawaiians by Bergendorff, Hasager, and Henriques (1988; see also the reply by Sahlins 1989) .7
The situation within anthropology is paralleled by the impact of poststructuralism on the broad front of the social sciences. Foucault's famous dictum (1976a Foucault's famous dictum ( , 1976b that there is no truth, only regimes of truth and power, was originally intended as a critique of arbitrary power, but by showing the fragility of all truth-claims it has had the effvct of undermining the legitimacy as well of oppositional movements forjustice against these same powers (Taylor 1984; Habermas 1987) .
There is a kernel of truth to the idea that all societies in the world are ~r o d u c t s of interaction with other societies and world society. Modern ethnography is a product of the Enlightenment and is a form of practice in which members of our academic subculture observe the other; as the late ~a t h l e e n Gough reminded us, anthropology is a child of imperialism. And then there are cases like the Philippine Tasaday, where a perfectly reasonable Southeast Asian semi-hunter-gatherer group, of which many examples exist, was seized on by the National Geographic and other media and popularized as ;he "Lost Stone Age" find of the century. Their recent exposure, and the media circus surrounding them, certainly fuels the cynicism that is itself the source of postmodernist sensibilities (Ler 1992; see also Dumont 1988; Berreman 1991; Duhaylungsod and Hyndman 1992) .
Nevertheless, to succumb to the enticements of the poststructuralists or revisionists would be a disaster. Where I part company with the poststructuralists is in the view that our knowledge of the other-being filtered through perceptions, language, and cultureis so suspect that subjects can only be provisionally and arbitrarily constructed. It is striking how the largely male, \.\'hit?, and Western poststructuralists are proclaiming the death of the subject, precisely at the moment when alternative voices-women, people of color, Third World and aboriginal peoples-are struggling to constitute themselves as subjects of history, as the makers of their own history (Mascia-Lees, Sharpe, and Cohen 1989; see also Spivak 1988) .
I d o not believe that anthropologists are nearly so powerless before the awesome task of representing the other's reality, or that the ethnography of the 1960s or 1970s was so flawed that it has to be discarded. Adam Kuper, in a recent critique of postmodernism, points out that the methodologies of the 1960s were not so very different from those of the p r e~e n t ,ã nd that their results were subjected to the critical scrutiny of peer review and comparative evidence. Kuper argues, and I would agree, that the view that ethnographic writing is more akin to fiction than it is to science does not accord with the history of the discipline. If the ethnographers of that not-so-distant era had passed their fiction off as science their readership and their peers would not have stood for it (Kuper 1990) . (For other critiques of "postmodernism" that attempt to reconstruct the "realist" foundations of social science epistemologies see Mascia-Lees, Sharpe, and Cohen 1989; Roth 1989; Sangren 1988; Gellner 1988; Lovibond 1989; Soper 1991 ; see also Bhaskar 1979 Bhaskar , 1986 Strictly speaking, the position taken by poststructuralists is not that nothing is real, since all take as given the existence of the power elite, of the state and its bureaucracies, and of the world system and its awesome power and reach. 'Therefore it would be more accurate to represent Proposition 1 as "Nothing is real . . . except power," which brings us directly to the second of our Propositions.
The "System" Is All-Powerful
The core proposition, "nothing is real," is reinforced by and reacts synergistically with the proposition, "the 'system' is all-powerful." \.Ye are living through a time in which history is accelerated; as the modern system continues to grow, things are moving faster and faster. Events and Drocesses that unfolded over centuries are comwressed into decades or years, and what transpired on a scalr ofyears now unfolds in the space ofmonths or weeks (Piel 1972:17-48; Harvey 1985:&35) . \Ve need to put the revisionist debate in the context of this recent history.
Not everyone within hunter-gatherer studics has paused to reflect on the titanic forces that are transforming the world before our eyes. The era of Late Capitalism is witnessing the accumulation of capital on an unprecedented scale, the rise of the multinational corporation, and the phenomenal growth of the state as an apparatus for shaping and controlling human behavior (Chomsky 1989; Hardison 1989) . In addition, one must try to comprehend the accelerating and expanding networks of information transfer on a world scale. Through television, e-mail, modems, cellular phones, fax, and other technologies it is possible to touch any part of the world in seconds, and through these same media we can disposc ofall the world's accumulated knowledge and images with the push of a button-what Frederic Jameson has called "a decentered global network of microcircuits and blinking lights." I t is not surprising that this power of instantaneous communication, combined with the vast output of the culture industries mentioned above, and the centralizing power of the state, leads to fantasies of omniscience and omnipotence for the small minority of the world's population that has access to such tools (Berman 1983) . Late Capitalism consumes the past with amazing rapidity, spews it out with such dizzying speed that it has the effect of obliterating the past, including the past of even 20 years ago.' All these processes tend to endow the force of capitalism with a mystique of enormous reach and totalizing power. '" Extcrnally, the spread of worldwide capitalism, sporadic and localized in the 18th century, a flood in the 19th and early 20th century, has become a veritable avalanche in the last third of the 20th century.' ' As John Bodley, Shelton Davis, and others have pointed out, the world's tribal peoples are sitting dircctly in the path of the world's largest multinational corporations (Bodley 1982 (Bodley , 1988 Davis 1977 ; see also Jorgensen 1990) . The scale of this penetration has increased in many cases by orders of magnitude in 10 or 20 years. T o take an example, when I first arrived in Maun, Botswana, in 1963 there was a single tour operator taking tourists into the Okavango Swamps. Today there are over 80 operators; many of them offer to take clients to the last of the River Bushmen, a man who now zets "discovered" 40 or 50 times a vear. T h e Dobe area in 1963-64 was even more isolated than the Okavango Swamps. In that era it received one motor vehicle visit every four to six weeks, for a total of 9 to 13 vehicles per year. In 1987 I counted a vehicle every ,four to six hours for an annual total of 1,400 to 2,100, a one-to two-hundredfold increase. Tom Headland notes that at the turn of the century there were 500 agriculturalists in the vicinity ofhis Agta communities in northeastern Luzon. Today there are 30,000 (personal communication, 1990) .
The Penan (or Punan) of Sarawak carried on regular long-distance trade with the coastal Dyak for hundreds of years; the impact of this trade on Penan institutions is the subject of another intense revisionist debate (Hoffman 1986; Brosius 1988) .12 But whatever their links to the coast may have been historically, they are nothing compared to the impact of the Japanese multinationals clear-cutting the rain forest at a rate faster than that in the Amazon. The Penan are now fighting for their lives as the multinationals, in conjunction with the state government (many of whose ministers hold logging concessions), clear-cut the Penans' traditional foraging areas, leaving them destitute and forcing them into eovernment resettlement schemes. The Penan have mounted roadblocks to -stop the bulldozers, and hundreds of Penan have been arrested, but the logging goes on (Burger 1990:94-95; Colchester 1989; CBC 1990 ; see also Hong 1987) . Similar examples could be drawn from virtually any part of the First, Second, or Third \Vorlds. This is the context of accelerating and massive change in which the field of hunter-gatherer studies is situated, and this is the source of the crisis of representation that the field is undergoing.
The point I want to emphasize is that fieldworkers who arrive in the 1980s and 1990s and observe these appalling conditions find it unbelievable that 30, 20, or even 10 yrars earlier, observers could have found societies with band structure, kinship, and subsistence patterns still functioning. Instead of reflecting on the magnitude of the changes in that 10-or 20-year period, these revisionists immediately assume that the earlier studies were wrong and they go on to blithely project the contemporary patterns of destruction or outside domination back into the past.
Universalizing the present is the dbvcrse of the equally flawed history that postulates pristine hunter-gatherers roaming the forest the year before the anthropologist arrives. M'hile the latter view has correctly come in for a wave ofcriticism, it could be argued that the revisionists' willingness to project the present onto the past indicates an enchantment with the power of Capital that is, at base, no less romantic and uncritical than the muchcriticized enchantment with the pristine or primitive other.
Mythologizing Pre-Revisionist Ethnography
It would be foolish to argue that studies of hunters and gatherers prior to, say, 1970 were above reproach and therefore immune to criticism. .Just as it would be equally foolish to argue that prior to 1970 all hunter-gatherers lived a pristlne existence. Scholars working in that era made mistakes, and that includes myself. My own thinking has undergone continual reassessment, and it might be appropriate at this point to dispel some of the myths that have grown up about exactly what Kalahari ethnographers stand for.
One misconception is that pre-revisionist ethnographers believed the San were pristine hunter-gatherers (\Vilmsen 1989:3,6, 10.33-43ff.; \Vilmsen and Denbow 1990:503-507) . But as early as 1965 I pointed out that thcgrcat majority ofthc cthrlic San-about 80%-were herders or farmers, or wcrc existing as clicnts or servants on Black cattle posts and on commercial ranches (Lee 1965:20) . Also in the 1960s I wrote in detail about the impact on the Dobe !Kung of European hunters and traders going back to the 1870s (Lee 1965:53-68) .
A second myth concerns the notion that despite recognizing changes elsewhere, ethnographers have maintained a vision of the Dobe !Kung as unchanging in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary (e.g., LVilmsen and Denbow 1990:520; Gordon 1984) . At all stages of fieldwork Kalahari ethnographers have grappled with this issue and have tried to give a scrupulous accounting of the non-!Kung elements present in the Dobe area, including the Herero presence, the Tswana presence, and the "European" presence. Any illusions I might have harbored about !Kung pristine conditions were dispelled by the late 1960s when new information came to light. When it became apparent, for example, that the actual economic circumstances of the !Kung had been misread, I
was at pains to correct first impressions (note that even in 1976 the word "pristine" appears in quotation marks):
As our field work continued, a more realistic picture of the "pristine" nature of the Dobe Area began to emerge. Most of the men of the Dobe area had had some experience at some point in their li\~es of herding the Bantu cattle, and about 20 percent of the young men were working on the cattle at any one time. Some had even owned goats or cattle in the past. Similarly the !Kung were not total strangers to agriculture. Many had learned the techniques by assisting their Bantu neighbors in planting, and in years ofgood rainfall some had planted small plots themsel\~es and had h a r~~e s t e d crops. [1976:181 Far from holding a rigid and unchanging view of hunter-gatherers, there is evidence that many (but not all) students ofthe subject have changed their thinking over the years, and these changes have taken the field away from the position of the 1960s: that studies of contemporary hunter-gatherers are primarily a tool for understanding the evolution of human behavior. 'Iwo of these changes in particular are worth noting.
Recognizing that foragers have coexisted with farmers sometimes for centuries,_yel have remained./oragers, has moved a number of scholars toward a much more complex understanding of the historical position of foragers. Some of the same evidence that led revisionists to discard the very concept of hunter-gatherers led the editors and authors of Polilics and Histor3, in Band Societies (Leacock and Lee 1982: 1-20) in a different direction. The book was structured around the argument that hunter-gatherers can only be understood by seeing how some of them have been involved with farmers for a long time yet have retained their cultural identity.'" Understanding hunter-gatherer ecology, however important, is not enough. One has to look at the internal dynamics and the articulation of this internal system with wider histories. This has led to a second change in the thinking of a number of anthropologists, a shift away from an emphasis on hunting and gathering as modes ofsubsistence, toward the broader concept of "communal mode of production."
From Subsistence Ecology to Mode of Production
As I have discussed elsewhere (Lee 198 1, 1988 (Lee 198 1, , 1990 , communal relations of production are a widespread and well-documented phenomenon. Yct, despite their ubiquity, the subject has been woefully undertheorized. Communal relations of production are observed among the !Kung as well as among a number of hunter-gatherers in a wide variety of historical settings. They are also found among peoples with mixed economies of foraging and horticulture, such as the Iroquois (Trigger 1987 (Trigger , 1990 , the Sharanahua (Siskind 1980), and the Batek (Endicott 1979). They are found even among former foragers in peripheral capitalism, such as aboriginal fringe dwellers in Darwin, Australia (Sansom 1980) ."
Accepting the existence of communal relations of production in diverse settings among foragers and (some) nonforagers, the next question is how this is to be explained. I find it extremely difficult to accept that all these diverse instances are to be seen, as revisionists have argued, strictly as societal impoverishment resulting fi-om exploitation by larger and more powerful societies (Schrire 1984: 18; Gordon 1984:220; M'ilmsen 1983 .
The explanation lies, rather, in one remarkable organizational principle shared by band societies and peoples like them: the ability to reproduce themselves while limiting the accumulation of wealth and power. Such societies operate within the confines of a metaphorical ceiling and floor: a ceiling above which one may not accumulate wealth and power and a floor below which one may not sink. These limits on both aggrandizement and destitution are maintained by powerful social mechanisms known as leveling devices (Lee 1990:242-245) . Such societies therefore have social and political resources of their own and are notjust sitting ducks waiting to adopt the first hierarchical model that comes along. Clastres (1989) said it best when he said that for these kinds of societies the main problem was resisting becoming a state; by this he meant resisting not only the imposition of a state from outside but also resisting the pressures building u p within, pressures leading toward accumulation and concentration of wealth and power.
Clastres did not imply that the nonstate societies lived in a state of perfect equality, nor would I. Hunter-gatherers may exhibit differences in wealth and power and they are certainly not nonviolent.'" prefer to follow the argument developed by Harriet Rosenberg in her recent research on !Kung aging and caregiving (1990) . Rosenberg uses the term "entitlement" to account for the ways in which !Kung elderly were cared for by relatives and nonrelatives alike, such that no one, not even childless people, would be denied access to support in old age. This was part of a general phenomenon in !Kung society in which everyone claimed and was recognized as being "entitled" to the necessities of life, by right of being a member of the society.
!Kung elders do not see themselves as burdens. They are not apologetic if they are not able to produce enough to feed themselves. They expect others to care for them when they can no longer do so. Entitlement to care is naturalized within the culture. Elders do not have to negotiate care as if it were a favor; rather it is percei~~ed as a right. [Rosenberg-1990:29] Will the "Real" San Please Stand Up?
The Kalahari revisionists claim to be restoring the San to history, but it is a curious view of history that the only way you can historicize foragers is to make them into pastoralists (or serfs) in the past! This seems to be an instance of life imitating art-of granting all agency to the dominating society whether capitalist or tributary, and making the histories of these diverse societies entirely reactive.'" Solway and I (1990) have shown that while some San peoples did become peasants and serfs of Black overlords, others did not. The !Kung San of the Dobe area lay outside of the main routes of trade and spheres of tributary power. They defended their lands against incursions from Blacks and \Vhites, and when they entered into client relations with Black patrons they did so on terms that were more favorable than that prevailing in other parts of the Kalahari. The result is that when systematic ethnographii study began in the 1950s and 1960s, observers found a society with a number of key institutions-language, kinship, ritual practices-intact, while other institutions-land tenure, dispute settlement, political dynamics-were clearly in a state of flux (Marshall 1976; Lee and DeVore 1976; Lee 1979; Shostak 1981 ; Solway and Lee 1990; Yellen 1977) .
Why did these distinctive institutions persist? They should not be seen simplv as holdovers or survivals from the past kept in place by the-weight of tradition. his irivializes their significance. These institutions are essrntial elements of cultural survival and they must be reproduced anew in each generation. Their presence is as good an indcx as any of the cultural viability and vitality of pcoples like the !Kung.I7 What is a t issue here is whether foragers broadly represent a diverse but nevertheless idrntifiable form of human society with characteristic social and economic properties, or whether the foragers' identity dissolves and merges with that ofserf, servant, client, slave, or rural proletariat.
What is the !Kung view of their own history? The !Kung see themselves as a people, increasingly circumscribed and threatened, but a people nonetheless with a strong sense of themselves. When told that they were really tributary appendages, long integrated into the economies of their more powerful neighbors, they were surprised and not a little offended. l 8
This brings us to two views of history and identity. One starts from cultural difference and postulates that there are cultures out there, which exist independent of academic constructions of them; for hunter-gatherers there is a lived reality regardless of whether or not they trade or render tribute to their neighbors. The other view sees historical status as constituted onl3, by membership in a regional trading bloc, by subject status in a chiefdom or state, or by the production ofa commodity for exchange; in other words, historical visibility can only be achieved through a relationship with other systems. The question that arises is whether that part of their history is the only thing or even the main thing that we want to know about hunter-gatherers. Leacock and I (1982) argued that foraging societies can only be understood as the product of a triple dynamic: first, the internal dynamic of communal foraging relations of production; second, the dynamics of their historical interactions with farmers, herders, and states; and third, the dynamic of articulation and incorporation within the modern world system. The difference between this position and the revisionist one is the latter's privileging the operation of the second and third dynamics at the expense of the first. 'I'he revisionist position accords minimal reality to foraging as a distinct mode of life, what Tim Ingold ( 1 990: 130) has recently called "a radically alternative mode of relatedness."'"
These two views of hunter-gatherers inscribe alternate discourses about the current conjuncture. T h e first says we are living in a time when the world is young, in flux, and still in the process of formation; some of the antecedent socictal fbrms are still there to br observed and expcrienced. T h e people we have come to call hunter-gatherers are examples, to varying degrees, of alternative ways of life, examples of difference. The other discourse says no, the world is old, what you are seeing is not difference, it is just another aspect of us, created by the same forces, the same "system" that created us. In my view this second discourse contains a number of unexamined assumptions about the transformativc power of commodities, and about the ability of mercantile and tributary systems to project their power and to impose their will on the peoples on their periphery."' How will we ever sort out the conflicting claims of the differins schools of thought in hunter-gatherer studies? Given the enormous load of ideology in hunter-gatherer studies, along with most branches of scholarship, I want to reiterate a plea fbr the importance of empirical evidence; I am as much opposed to mindless empiricism as anyone, but without empirical evidence debates will disintegrate into ideological name-calling.
What is urgently needed in this era of disillusion is the middle path: a working discipline that sees science, humanism, and critical reflection as three components of a single field; scholars need empiricism tempered by reflexivity and a dialectic between the two. All of this should be framed within a sense of history and political economy, to ensure that a scholar's situated history and the relationship between scholar and subject arc not lost. Scholars must interrogate assumptions as the poststructuralists suggest, but after that, I for one would like to get on with it. If sound methods demonstrate that huntergatherers are historically serfs or pastoralists or whatever, then so be it. But the current crop ofrevisionist arguments are dubious, to say the least." 'She task ofsituating huntergatherers historically has barely begun, and there remains a great deal of scope for archeological, ethnographic, and cthnohistoric investigations to resolve the question of to what degree hunter-gatherers can be said to be culturally autonomous or integrated into larger systems at various points in their histories." 1 also suggest that these questions will motivate the production of the kinds of knowledge that will be used by future generations, sifted and rcsiftcd long after the debates of this decade fade into the past.
T o recover a link to the real world, to empirical reality, is precisely what some scholars tried to do in the 1960s with the work diaries, demography, subsistence ecology, and careful ethnography (e.g., Helm 1965; Hiatt 1965; Marshall 1961; Rose 1960) . This is a scholarly tradition that many are carrying on today, while constantly improving their mcthods. But empiricism, however critically informed, is not thc whole story. Self-definitions change. In the 1960s, many anthropologists saw themselves as crusading empiricists, replacing speculation with facts, but it is now possiblc to recognize that, like all scholars in the human sciences, the cthnographcrs of the 1950s and 1960s were also storytellers, weavcrs of narratives (after all, the origin of the word "text" is from "tcxtilcs"). It was not only a qucstion of z~hat they had to say but also how they said it. T o this extent thosc who cmphasizc anthropology's affinities to literature do have a p~i n t .~"
As Donna Haraway has notcd (1989) , onc of the master narratives constructcd (in part) from hunter-gathcrer data has been the story of human nature and life in thc "state of naturc": who wc arc as a species, our past, and by implication our future. The poststructuralist project focuses our attention almost exclusively on the "constructedncss" of these narrativcs. But just becausc they are constructed doesn't mean that they have no claim to empirical validity or that thc scarch for knowlcdge of the past is an illegitimate entcrprisc. Ethnographic analogy to the past docs involve leaps of extrapolation and thereforc must be treated with cxtreme caution, but thc archcological rccord can and does provide direct knowledge of the distant past.
l'he problem remains, howcvcr, that like cthnography archcological interpretations of thc past arc no less shaped by the ideological forccs of the prcsent. This highlights the critical need for maintaining and enlarging the sphere of knowledge-in both archeology and ethnography-that transcends the ideological battles of each era: the need for a version of anthropology that is both critical and empirical (cf. O'hlcara 1989; Carrithers 1990) .
Given the difficulties of living up to thc demands of doing this kind of work and the many pitfalls, it is surprising how much good work is being done in huntcr-gatherer studies. Rejecting thc vicw of foragcrs as timclcss primitivcs or as rural proletarians, there arc thosc who would scc hunting and gathcring as a way of lifc that cxists in the prescnt yet is different from LVcstcrn urban modes of lifc. T o varying degrees these students attempt to maintain a sensc ofbalance and proportion between the reality of their scholarly world and the reality of thcir subjects, and betwcen the methodological demands of the threc cultures."
One trend that seems to be prcsent in all thrce methodological currents is a move by some (but by no mcans all) away from sccing hunting and gathcring peoplcs as objects of anthropological inquiry, to a situation in which they become the subjecls of thcir own history and often thc directors of thcir own rcscarch. This has paralleled the dcvelopmcnt of political consciousness among indigenous people. As foragcrs and former foragcrs havc become morc involved in struggles for their rights, hunter-gathercr studies have become much morc of a collaborative enterprise: working with the pcople in thcir struggles to drtermine thcir futurcs."" Perhaps the most significant dcvclopmcnt of the last decade is indigenous peoples speaking to us in their own voices; for cxamplc, the Canadian Innu, Lubicon, TemcAugama, and others in Richardson (1989) . T h e Gitksan and LVet'suct'cn people of British Columbia arc good examples offormer (and continuing) foragers who havc addressed thc larger public dircctly in a variety of voices and settings, including the courts (Stcrritt 1989; People of 'Ksan 1980; Gisday Ll'a and Dclgum Uukw 1989) . Increasingly, indigenous peoples arc making political alliances with environmentalists, feminists, youth groups, and pcoples of color.
O n this ncw and expanded political terrain an intcrcsting qucstion concerns how hunters and gatherers thcmselvcs rcgard hunter-gathercr studics. Clearly the cultural rcnaissance under way in a number of native communitics has gcncrated considerable interest in "traditional" ethos and world view, governancc, subsistcncc, arts, crafts, cthnobotany, and hcaling; for thcsc and other spheres of knowledge, the eldcrs and anthropological texts are the main sourccs of information.'" Lee] 
Conclusion
This articlc has delineated thc crisis of rc~rcsentation in hunter-gatherer studics and has attempted to comprehend thc underlying epistemological and ideological roots of the crisis. Thc field of hunter-gathcrcr studies has been undergoing a serics of transformations and the original raison d'etrc has rcquircd reassessment. Yct, despite thc fundamental challenges of the "rcvisionists," it can be argued that a core of relevance to both scholarly and indigenous peoples' agcndas remains in huntcr-gathcrcr studics; that the field is rcsponding to this challcnge is indicatcd by thc shift away from simplistic evolutionary arguments toward morc nuanccd, historically sensitized, and critical undcrstandings. In this respect the altered contours of hunter-gatherer studies represent a successful incursion by humanists and political economists on a terrain that had been largely dominated by natural-science-oriented methods and philosophies.
In the preface to ;Wan the Hunter, DeVore and I wrote, "\.Ire cannot avoid the suspicion that many of [thc contributors] were led to live and work among the hunters bccausc of a feeling that the human condition was likely to be morc clcarly drawn here than among other kinds of societies" (Lce and DeVorc 1968:ix) . I now believc this is wrong. T h e human condition is about poverty, injustice, exploitation, war, sufferins. T o scck the human condition onc must go, as Wolfand Hansen (1975) did, to the barrios, shantytowns, and palatial mansions of Rio, Lima, and Mexico City, where massive inequalities of wealth and powcr havc produced fabulous abundance for some and misery for most. When anthropologists look at huntcr-gathcrers they are seeking somcthing clsc: a vision of human lifc and human possibilities without the pomp and glory, but also without thc miscry and inequity of statc and class society. Almost all of humanity lives today in highly organized bureaucratized socictics ofcnormous scale and systematic inequalities. Hunter-gatherers, in spite of the inducements (or thrcats?) to become incorporated, choosc for whatevcr reasons to resist and to live lives vcry different from that of thc majority. The pace is slower, technology simplcr, numbers smaller, incquality less, and the relationship to land and rcsourccs-the scnsc of placeis on a radically different basis. Following Clastres, I havc argued that what sets huntcrgatherers apart is their ability to rcproduce themselves while seuere(y limiting thc accumulation and concentration ofwcalth and powcr. This featurc they share with a number of simplc horticultural and pastoral societics. Since the accumulation of wealth and power (and resistance to it) is the driving force of much of human history, it follows that socictics that don't have this dynamic must have a dynamic of a difli:rcnt sort: what Tim Ingold has called a "diffcrcnt kind of sociality" ( 1990: 130-1 3 1) .
If indigenous peoples want to adopt a Western (or Soviet) way of lifc, the door is open; in fact, the prcssurcs to conform are immensc'. Thc fact that this has not happened, that some foragers still pursue alternative lifeways not in isolation but in full awarencss of alternatives, is a persuasive argumcnt against the two propositions that framcd the prcscnt essay. There is somethin<? out there btyond the reach oj'the world s_ystem (capitalist or other~lise). The "~ystem" is poztler&l but not omnipotent. Pockets of resistance persist and show us that cvcn in this hard-bitten postmodern age other ways of being arc possiblc.
Since so many of the world's intractable problems dcrivc from the gigantic maldistribution of wealth and powcr, it stands to rcason that socictics that can reproduce thcmselves without exploitation havc a great deal to teach us. As thc world's peoples struggle to rcdcfine alternative visions in thc aftermath of the Cold \.l'ar, I am convinced that huntcr-gatherer studies, far from being the fantasy projection of uncritical romantics, havc a role to play: in the movement for justicc for indigenous peoples, and as part of a largcr movement to rccapturc wholcness from an increasingly fragmented and alienating modernity.
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'LVhether hunter-gatherers are more accurately called gatherer-hunters to acknowledge the predominance of gathered foods over game is an issue I have addressed in detail elsewhere (Lee 1979 ).
The term "fbragers" is an economical shorthand that does not prejudge the issue either way (e.g., Lee 1981) . 'Snow's position in turn can be traced back to a 19th-century critical Romanticism, which saw science as providing an ideological basis for the spread and destructive effects of capitalism. ( I thank Victor Barac for this observation.)
'The first draft of this paper had been completed before I became aware of Michael Carrithers's (1990) article, which also develops the figure of the "two cultures" as a means of comprehending contemporary anthropology.
'LYhile work from this perspective still constitutes only a small fraction of hunter-gatherer research. it would be a serious error to ignore. as manv within the field have. its ~r o f o u n d i m~l i c ations, not only fbr researchers but, mark important, f i r the anthropological subjkcts themsel;.es. 'For a thoughtful and balanced discussion of this issue see Paynter 1989 . "For a late conversion to relativism sre Leach 1989 ; on the fallacy of "hyperrelativism" see Trigger 1989. 'M'ilmsen uses the Hobsbawm and Ranger thesis to the same effect in a section of his book entitled "The Invention of 'Bushmen' " (1989:24-26) . "11s a case in point, Wilmsen, after stating that his "book is . . . not an ethnography" and proclaiming the end of "the ethnographic era of anthropology" (1989:xii) , goes on to devote several hundred pages to the presentation of "ethnographic" data on the San in the fbrm of ethnohistory, genealogies, demography, economic anthropology, and subsistence ecology. "David Lowenthal (1985) has offered a provocative discussion of how both selective cultural amnesia and an obsession with the past characterize contradictory contemporary views of history.
""l'he feeling of omniscience and instant global communication was nowhere more clearly expressed than in the television coverage of the first days of the war in the Persian Gulf, where major developments were seen as they occurred during North American prime time.
"Many ofthese ideas are drawn from the works of Ernest Mandel ), Fred Jameson (1984 , and the thought of Marshall MacLuhan.
'"offman has argued, like Wilmsen, that the Penan were locked into the coastal trade centuries ago and had long since become subjects ofcoastal suzerains. Brosius (1988:6) . A similar point is made by John Wright (1989:535) and by Donna Haraway (1989: 194-197, 227) , who clearly locates Lee as a member of the "revisionists." The revisionists for their part seem to prefer to retain a 1960s image ofhunter-gatherer studies as a more convenient straw-person. "Some would argue, along with Phillip E. L. Smith, that communal relations and other aspects of foraging lifeways can be discerned in frontier European populations likr the transhumant English settlers in Newfoundland from the 18th century on (Smith, personal communication, 1991) .
"For example, the appearance of slavery in complex fbraging societies like those of the Northwest Coast (Donald 1983) , and of other forms of inequality elsewhere (e.g., Legros 1985; , need to be seriously studied. And Clastres's own treatment of several topics-for one, gender-leaves much to be desired.
'('Bender and Morris in their introduction to Volume 1 of Hunters and Gatherers (Ingold, Riches, and Lt'oodburn 1988a) perceptively make a similar critique of the revisionist view of histor): (1988:7-14) :
Above all the message of [Politics and History in Band Societies] must be that gatherer-hunters have their own history. An understanding of the processes of encapsulation has to work in tandem with an understanding that gatherer-hunter variability, past or present, has an internal dynamic. Change i11 gatherer-hunter societies does not wait up011 the arrival of land-hungry farmers, nor upon capitalist penetration. [ I 988: 13-141 ''Having said this, there is still room to accommodate Alan Barnard's (1988) arguments that eth~licity and identity of Sa11 peoples are co~lstructed in part from their mutual accommodations and antagonisms with other peoples.
I8Not only is the assertion of their "subjugation" vehemently denied by the !Ku11g themselves, but their view of the timing of the entrance of non-!Kung into their lands directly contradicts the "revisionist" position. When !Ku11g elders were asked to identify which of their African neighbors-the ~e r e r o s , Tswa~las, or ~a~e i -f i r s t came into their land, they insisted it was none of them: the Europeans came first, thllowed by other ~Zfricans (Solway and Lee 1990:115) . Since the Europea~ls o~lly arrived in the 1870s, this renders moot the revisionist argument that the !Kung of the Dobe area were subjugated in the 1st millennium i1.U. !Ku11g oral histories of the colonial period are presented in Lee (199 1) .
19111 fact, Ingold has argued that hunter-gatherer sociality is of such a different order that the term "society" is inappropriate with reference to them and should be reserved for describing postforager peoples ( 1990: 130-13 1) .
"'In the Kalahari, for example, there are a number of problems i11 applying 20th-century patterns of power-holding and projecting them back into the past of the Dobe !Kung. For over 90% of the centuries of S a n /~l a c k interaction, the putative overlords were not capitalists or even mercantilists, but Africa11 kin-ordered and tributary fbrmations. In order fbr the rrvisionist model to work in this prehistoric context one has to endow 1st-and 2nd-millennium chiefdoms (if that is what they were) with the same predatory impulses and the same ability to exercise power across great distances that the historic Tswana chiefdoms briefly possessed in the 19th century, under the intense pressure of the Boer military threat and the competition of the British traders and imperialists. Despite the claims of the revisionists (e.g., Wilmsen and Denbow 1990:449-503) , there is no convincing evidence that any group in what is now northwestern Botswana had that kind ofpower before the late 19th century, least of all the Tawana chiefdom, the weakest of the eight major tribes that made up the Tswana nation (Tlou 1985) .
"For a critique of revisio~list historiography in the Kalahari see Lee and Gue~lther ( 199 1) . ' "or two excellent examples of how this can be done see Trigger (1990) and Hunn (1990) . "'As I wrote in 1979:
hlodern anthropology 110 longer believes that the scientist of culture is neutral: today's epistemology i~lcludes the observer along with the "nafiz'es" in the ,fipld oj'uieu'. When ack~lowledged and used creatively the observer's likes and dislikes, his [sic] prejudices and e~lthusiasms, become a n instrument of discovery, a part of the learning process itself and not external to it. [Lee 1979:8, emphasis in original] "Lt'hile an inventory of recent work in hunter-gatherer studies is far beyond the scope of this paper, a few examples tiom two of the "paradigms" are appended to illustrate the abundance of work in the 1980s and l990s (see also Note 23).
" Scientists": Ingold (1986a , 1986b , Lt'oodburn (1980. 1982, 1988) , and Wiessner (1982) ; Lt'interhalder (1990) ) Smith (1988) ; see also Winterhalder and Smith (1981) ; Smith and Boyd (1990) . Vierich (1982) , Cashdan (1987 Cashdan ( , 1990 , Griffin (1989) , Kent (1989) , and the Harvard Pygmy project Peacock 1988, Bailey et al. 1989) .
"Humanists": Brody (1981) , Myers (1986b) , Ridington (1990) , Shostak (1981) , Cruikshank (1991) , Bird-David (1990) . For some interesting recent work on Wrstern perceptions and constructions of hunter-gatherers see Dumont (1988) , Sponsel ( 1992) , Armitage and Kennedy (1989) ; see also hlyers (l986a). (For various combinations of all three paradigms see Ingold, Riches, and Woodburn [ 1988a 2iThis renegotiatrd ethnographic ethic can be seen clrarly in the work of some of thr "political economists": 11sch ( 1984), Chance (1990) , Daly (1988) , Duhaylungsod and Hyndman ( 1992) , Feit (1985 Feit ( , 1991 , Hitchcock (1977 Hitchcock ( , 1988 , Hitchcock and Brandenburgh (l990) , Hunn (1990) , Kidd (1990) , Peterson ( 1982 Peterson ( , 1985 , Peterson and hlatsuyama ( 199 I ) , Sansom ( 1985) , and Tanner (1979) . Special mention should be made of the work of hlegan Biesele and ,John hlarshall, who have been working with the !Kung San of Namibia through the most dramatic changes in their history (Biesele and Weinberg 1990).
2"0n this score 1 fbund it instructive that so many members ofindige~lous Alaskan organizations endorsed the 1990 Fairbanks Conference on Hunting and Gathering Societies, not only contributing papers and workshops but also supporting CHAGS financially. These sponsors included Bering Straits Native Corporation, NIZNI\ Regional Corporation Inc., Interior Fish Processors of Alaska, and the Interior hfayors' Association of Alaska.
